Abstract. We introduce the notion of Cross-Unlinkability for group signature schemes. Considering groups organized in a tree structure, where belonging to the parent group is required to join a new group, CrossUnlinkability enables a cascade revocation process that takes into account the underlying tree structure, while ensuring anonymity for nonrevoked users, in particular, towards the managers of the other groups. We show how to achieve Cross-Unlinkability using the Verifier-Local Revocation group signature scheme of Bringer and Patey at Secrypt 2012, by exploiting its property of Backward Unlinkability.
Introduction
Group signatures [9] enable authorized users to sign anonymously on behalf of a group. We consider in the following the case of VLR (Verifier-Local Revocation) group signatures. The VLR property [5] guarantees that only the public parameters and a revocation list RL are required to check a signature. Concretely, when a user is revoked, a revocation token that is derived from his signing key is added to RL. This token is used by verifiers to prevent revoked users from further signing.
In this paper we consider a scenario where users have access to several groups, equipped with group signatures, that have some dependencies between them: the set G of these groups is partially ordered and can be represented as a tree. When one wants to apply for new signing keys in a group G l , one has to own valid signing keys for the parent group G k in the tree G. This organization also requires that it should be possible to revoke automatically across different groups. To this aim, the new signing key is derived from the key of the same member for G k in order to maintain a link. One important issue in our model is then to ensure the privacy of this link.
This scenario and the associated security properties are particularly adapted to identity management systems. In this setting, a user owns several identities derived from a strong identity (e.g. the national identity) while maintaining privacy and unlinkability between the different identities, even towards to the providers of the other identities.
We address this problem of derivation of group signatures keys from other group signature keys with privacy properties in mind. We in particular want to ensure that a given group manager cannot retrieve -except in case of revocations -the link between a signature in his group and a signature, issued by the same user, in any of his children groups. Our goal is to parallelize several instances of VLR group signatures while fulfilling the following additional requirements:
-A user registered into a given group should be able to sign anonymously on behalf of this group; -When a user asks for registering to a new group, he has to prove that he can sign on behalf of the parent group, and the new keys delivered by the group manager should be derived from the pre-required keys; -The derivation process should be compatible with a revocation process that echoes downwards, i.e. when a user M i is revoked from a given group G l , he must also be revoked from all the groups that are below G l in the tree G. -Despite these revocation and derivation processes, only the manager of a given group G l (and the signer) can learn information on the signer when looking at a signature for the group G l , provided this signer is not revoked from G l . Particularly, the other group managers learn nothing more than any observer and thus cannot link the signer to the members of their groups. This property, that we name Cross-Unlinkability, is an essential feature of our proposition.
Recall that, when a user is revoked, a revocation token that is derived from his signing key is added to RL. It enables to reject the further signatures of this user but it may also give a way to identify his previously made signatures. To prevent this, some VLR group signatures (e.g. [8, [15] [16] [17] 19] ) enjoy an additional property called Backward Unlinkability (BU). The usual mechanism to enable BU is to split the time into several periods and derive revocation tokens associated to each period so that two revocation tokens for the same user for different periods are unlinkable.
We here adapt the derivation process for revocation tokens, no longer to enjoy BU, but to derive keys between the different group signature schemes. In our context defined above, the direction of the derivation is from a parent group G k to a child group G l in G. In a sense, such a child group is seen as a time period for the VLR signature with BU associated to G k , unlinkability between different time periods in the original schemes with BU is transformed into unlinkability between the different children. We adapt the BU derivation process so that the new keys are not known by the parent group manager, while satisfying the requirement for the revocation process to be echoed to the lower levels.
For instance, consider the group tree described in Figure 1 . We assume that a science faculty sets up a system using groups signatures, used for instance for access control. In this example, applying for a key for the Bioinformatics Team requires to previously own a key for the Computer Science Department. We also wish that, when one signs on behalf of, e.g., the Mechanics Department, anonymity of the signer is guaranteed against the managers of all other groups, including the managers of the parent group (Science Faculty), the children groups (Fluid Dynamics and Solid Mechanics) or the sibling groups (Computer Science Dept.). Other settings with several parallel group signatures have already been introduced. Multi-group signatures [1, 3] enable a user to sign on behalf of either a single group or several groups to which he belongs. The notion of hierarchy between group signatures has been introduced in [14] , where having a key for an upper group allows to sign on behalf of lower groups. Hierarchical Group Signatures [18] define a group organization that is close to ours: the managers are organized in a tree structure, but all of them do not manage signers, some only manage groups of managers; anonymity and (a weaker notion of) unlinkability between the users of different groups are considered but there is no possibility of revocation. Attribute-based group signatures [12, 13] , anonymous proxy signatures [11] and delegatable credentials [2] are also related notions. None of the above constructions however considers at the same time group hierarchy, unlinkability across the groups and revocation through the groups.
The process described in this paper is instantiated with the Bringer and Patey group signature [8] for a better readability but it can easily be adapted to other group signature schemes enjoying BU (e.g. [15] [16] [17] 19] ).
In [6] , Bringer et al. introduce the concept of cross-unlinkability for anonymous authentications, adapting the biometric-based remote authentication protocol of [7] to the hierarchical setting. In this paper, we formalize further this concept with the model of cross-unlinkable group signatures. We detail a construction and give its security properties. We finally prove that our construction satisfies these properties.
VLR Group Signatures
Group signatures [9] are a particular case of digital signatures where authorized members of a group are allowed to sign anonymously on behalf of the group.
The anonymity can only be ended by the Group Manager who can also revoke misbehaving users (or users wanting to leave). In the particular case of VerifierLocal Revocation (VLR) [5] , anyone knowing the public parameters of the group can verify the signatures (including revocation checks). Groups involved in VLR group signatures are dynamic: users can be revoked (voluntarily or not) at any time. The revocation process consists in adding revocation tokens to a public revocation list which is taken into account by the verifiers when they check a signature.
Components
The following algorithms are the components of a VLR group signature scheme with Backward Unlinkability. In the context of group signatures with BU, time is divided into time periods j ∈ [1, . . . , T ]. We denote by G the group associated to the group signature. If the signature does not enable BU, then the algorithms do not depend on time periods.
KeyGen GS : Generates the public parameters for the system and the public/secret keys of the group manager GM. It takes as input a security parameter µ and outputs the secret key msk of GM, its public counterpart mpk, an empty global revocation list RL and empty period revocation lists RL j 's, for j ∈ [1, . . . , T ], and the public parameters gpk. msk is kept secret by the GM, the other elements are published. Join GS : Creates keys for a new user M i and allows him to produce group signatures. It outputs the user key sk i and the corresponding revocation tokens rt i (global revocation token) and rt ij (period), for all j ∈ [1, . . . , T ]. sk i is stored by the user and GM stores a part of sk i and revocation tokens. Sign GS : Takes as input a message m, a time period j and a signer's key sk i .
Returns a signature σ of user M i on the message m at period j. Verify GS : Takes as input a time period j, a message m, a signature σ and the public parameters gpk of the system and the current Revocation Lists RL (global) and RL j (period). Checks if the message has been well-signed by an unrevoked group member without revealing the signer's identity. Open GS : Takes a signature σ as input and reveals the identity of the signer.
Can only be performed by the GM, since it requires to know the revocation tokens of all users. Revoke GS : Revokes a user M i from the group at a time period j. His revocation token rt ij is added to RL j . (For a global revocation, the same process is executed with rt i and RL.)
Security properties
We describe the security properties that can be required from a VLR group signature scheme with BU. Our description is a slight variant of the one of [8] but it is also fulfilled by the [8] scheme. In particular, we do not require the games to follow a chronological order, since it is not necessary in the proofs of security of [8] .
Correctness: Every check of a well-formed signature returns valid if the user who has issued it is not revoked.
The Traceability property ensures that no attacker (or group of attackers) is able to forge a signature that can not be traced to one of the corrupted users which participated in its forgery.
Traceability: Let us consider the following Traceability game played by an adversary A. Setup: The challenger C runs the KeyGen algorithm, playing the role of the GM. He obtains gpk, mpk and msk. He provides A with gpk and mpk. Queries: A can make the following queries to the challenger, provided that it well specifies the time period j: -Join: A requests the enrolment of a member M i to G. C obtains the keys for M i for G. A obtains nothing. -Sign: A requests that a member M i of G signs a message m for the current period j. The challenger computes the signature σ of M i on m for j. A obtains σ. -Corruption: A requests the corruption of a given registered member M i .
He obtains the secret key of M i for G. The member M i is revoked at all time periods. -Revocation: A requests the revocation of a user M i from G for period j.
He learns the revocation token of M i that is disclosed during this phase. Output: A outputs a challenge message m, a period j and a signature σ on m and wins if:
1. Verify GS (m,σ,j,gpk,mpk,RL j )=valid 2. A did not obtain σ by making a Sign Query on m. The scheme is said to satisfy Traceability if no polynomial probabilistic adversary is able to win the above game with a non-negligible probability.
The Backward Unlinkability property is an extension of the notion of SelflessAnonymity [5] to the multi-period setting. Selfless-Anonymity implies that only the signer and the Group Manager learn information on the producer of a given signature, provided that the signer is not revoked. Backward Unlinkability moreover ensures that valid signatures remain anonymous even after the signer's revocation. Revoked users can also come back after their revocation into the group and use their previous keys without any loss of anonymity. That is why we require time to be divided into several periods so that the signer uses different parameters for the different periods.
However notice that when one is revoked at a given period, he loses anonymity on all his signatures issued at this particular period, even if they were produced before the revocation. Anonymity is only guaranteed on the signatures made at previous periods where the user was not revoked.
The Selfless-Anonymity definition can be obtained from the definition of Backward Unlinkability by applying it to the case where only one time period is available.
Backward Unlinkabilty: Let us consider the following BU game played by an adversary A: Setup: The challenger C runs the KeyGen algorithm, playing the role of the GM. He obtains gpk, mpk and msk. He provides A with gpk and mpk. Queries: A can make the following queries to the challenger, provided that it well specifies the time period j: -Join: A requests the enrolment of a member M i to G. C obtains the keys of M i for G. A obtains nothing. -Sign: A requests that a member M i of G signs a message m for the current period j. The challenger computes the signature σ of M i on m for j. A obtains σ. -Corruption: A requests the corruption of a given registered member M i .
He obtains the secret key of M i for G. -Revocation: A requests the revocation of a user M i from G for period j.
He learns the revocation token of M i that is disclosed during this phase. Challenge: A outputs a challenge message m, a period j and two different members M 0 and M 1 , such that:
1. M 0 and M 1 are both registered to G; 2. A corrupted neither M 0 nor M 1 ; 3. M 0 and M 1 are not revoked from G at period j C chooses a random bits b ∈ R {0, 1} and runs Sign GS for M b at period j using message m. The obtained signature σ * is transmitted to A. Restricted Queries: A can make the same queries as in the Queries phase, as long as this does not contradict the above requirements 1 to 3 of the Challenge phase. Output: A outputs a guess β ∈ {0, 1} on b. The scheme satisfies Backward-Unlinkability if the probability |Pr(β = b) − 1/2| is negligible. Exculpability Nobody, even the Group Manager, is able to produce another user's signature. (This property is not always satisfied by VLR group signature schemes. We refer the reader to [8, 10] for a formal definition that is adapted to the schemes used in the following.)
The CL and BP Schemes
As an example and for a better understanding, we use the scheme of Bringer and Patey [8] , that we denote by BP, that fulfils all the above security requirements. Particularly, it enables Backward Unlinkability using the usual technique of dividing the time into several periods and deriving revocation tokens for the members that depend on the time and on the secret key of the user but that cannot be linked with each other. We moreover use the patched version of the scheme of Chen and Li [10] , also described in [8] , that we denote by CL, and that is merely the BP scheme without BU. In particular, we can use the same parameters and keys for both schemes. We first describe the CL scheme. Notice that, since it does not enable BU, algorithms are independent of the time period.
KeyGen CL (µ) Choose bilinear groups G 1 , G 2 , G T of order a µ-bit prime number p that is safe, a prime number q and a pairing e :
and checks that s f ∈ Z p and c = H(gpk||F ||R ||n i ). He chooses x i ∈ R Z p and computes 
rti . Output valid if all checks succeed. Otherwise output invalid. Revoke CL (RL, rt i ) Add the member's revocation token rt i to the current revocation list RL and publish the thus updated RL. Open CL (σ, gpk, mpk, msk, {rt i |M i is in the group}) For every member M i ∈ G, use the Revocation Check algorithm on the signature σ with a revocation list set as RL = {rt i }. When the test fails, output the corresponding M i .
We now describe the BP scheme. Notice that, since it enables BU, algorithms depend on the time period.
KeyGen BP (µ) Run KeyGen CL (µ). Furthermore, choose a security parameter λ for the proofs of knowledge involving double logarithms. Pick h 1 , . . . , h T ∈ R Z * q and add λ and the h j 's to gpk Join BP (M i , msk, gpk, mpk) Run Join CL (M i , msk, gpk, mpk) .
Run the Signature Check of Verify CL (m, σ, gpk, mpk, RL) with some adaptations: check that L ∈ G 1 and that s 1 , . . . , s λ ∈ Z p , and add j and L in the input of the hash function to compute c. ∀l = 1 . . . λ, let b l be the l th bit of d..
Run the Revocation Check of Verify CL (m, σ, gpk, mpk, RL). Moreover, check that ∀rt ij ∈ RL j , L = B rtij . Output valid if all checks succeed. Otherwise output invalid. Revoke BP (j, RL, RL j , rt i , rt ij ) For a global revocation, run Revoke CL (RL, rt i ).
For a period revocation, add the member's revocation token rt ij to the current revocation list RL j and publish the thus updated RL j . Open BP (σ, j, gpk, mpk, msk, {rt ij |M i is in the group}) For every member M i ∈ G, use the Revocation Check algorithm on the signature σ with a revocation list set as RL j = {rt ij }. When the test fails, output the corresponding M i .
Notice that the Revoke GS and Open GS are standard procedures of VLR group signature schemes and are not specific to the BP and CL schemes.
We recall the security results given in [8, 10] , where DDH refers to the Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption, DL to the Discrete Logarithm assumption and q-SDH refers to the q-Strong Diffie-Hellman assumption [4] . The adapted DHH is an adaptation of the DDH assumption described in [8] .
Theorem 1 (Security of the BP and CL Schemes).
In the random oracle model, the CL scheme described above achieves Correctness, Selfless Anonymity (under the DDH assumption), Exculpability (under the DL assumption) and Traceability (under the q-SDH assumption).
In the random oracle model, the BP scheme described above achieves Correctness, Backward Unlinkability (under the adapted DDH assumption), Exculpability (under the DL assumption) and Traceability (under the q-SDH assumption).
Our Model of Cross-Unlinkable Hierarchical Group Signatures
We here describe our model for a hierarchical group signature setting where groups follow a tree hierarchy. Our goal is to constrain that, when one wants to acquire a group signature key for a group G k , one has to prove that one belongs to the parent group in the tree G. Our model does not change much the way the members of a particular group use group signatures. It focuses on the way the member keys for the different groups are linked to enable at the same time a cascade derivation process and unlinkability between signatures issued by the same user for different groups, in particular towards the group managers. In our model, only the signer and the group manager of the concerned group (and particularly not the other GM's) are able to identify the producer of a given signature. We also precise that, within a group, the way we use signatures does not enable us to enjoy BU. Nevertheless, we achieve Selfless-Anonymity [5] as for usual VLR group signature schemes, where, still, only the signer and the GM are able to tell who produced a particular signature but where, once a member has been revoked, he loses his anonymity on all his signatures.
Setting
We assume that there are several groups G k organized as a tree G with a root G 0 . Each group G l has a group manager GM l and we will denote by k l the fact that the group G k is a parent of the group G l . The functionalities of our protocol are the following.
KeyGen is an extension of the KeyGen GS algorithm to the hierarchical group setting, it specifies how the parameter choices of the different group managers should be related.
KeyGen(λ):
This is run by the GM's. It takes as input a security parameter λ. GM 0 first returns the public parameters gpk for all the group signatures. Then each GM l creates a secret/public key pair (msk l , mpk l ) and publishes mpk l .
The Enrolment algorithm specifies how a group manager GM l and a user M i applying to join G l interact to provide M i with a key for G l . If G l = G 0 , this algorithm calls the Derivation algorithm, that we describe next.
For a group G l , this algorithm is jointly run by the group manager GM l and a user M i . The input for GM l is his secret key msk l , it also requires the result of the Derivation algorithm if G l = G 0 . It outputs a key sk The Derivation algorithm is a key step of our setting. A member M i applying to a group G l , child of G k in G, interacts with the manager GM l of G l .
M i proves that he owns keys for G k and, if the proof has been successful, the interaction enables G l to derive a key for M i for G l that depends on his key for G k (but without learning the latter key). Using the thus derived key, GM l can finalize the Enrolment algorithm and provides M i with his new key.
For a group G l such that k l, this algorithm is jointly run by a user M i requiring to get group signature keys for the group G l and the group manager GM l of G l . The input for M i is his group signature key for the parent group G k of G l in G and the input for GM l is his secret key msk l . It returns a new secret key for M i for G l if M i successfully proves to GM l that he is a non revoked member of G k .
The Sign and Verify algorithms perform the same functionalities as the Sign GS and Verify GS algorithms for a given group G l , using group signatures without Backward Unlinkability, such as the CL scheme for instance. Notice that there are no time periods and the signatures are consequently independent of the time. The Revocation algorithm answers to what we expect from our cascade revocation capability. The goal of the downwards revocation process it to ensure that once a user has been revoked from a given group G l , this user is also revoked from all groups that are children of G l in G, the children of these children, and so on. The optional upwards revocation is there to give the possibility for a group manager to report to the parent group manager that a user has been revoked. If this is not executed, GM k does not learn anything on the identity of the user revoked by GM l . to the GM k of the group G k that is the parent of G l , who can then decide to revoke (in that case we will say that the upwards revocation has been accepted) or not the user, using rt k l i to retrieve the user's revocation token rt k i for G k .
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Requirements
We here describe the security properties that we expect from cross-unlinkable group signatures. Correctness is the same property as in the mono-group setting. Traceability and Cross-Unlinkability are adaptations of Traceability and SelflessAnonymity to our hierarchical group signature setting, with privacy issues in mind.
Correctness: The signature of a member M i who is registered to the group G l and who is not revoked from this group, using the Sign algorithm is accepted by any verifier that follows the protocol.
Traceability ensures that if a signature σ for the group G l is checked as valid, then the manager GM l of G l is able to find who made σ, and it is impossible to mislead him.
Traceability: Setup: The challenger C runs the KeyGen algorithm, playing the role of all the GM's. He obtains gpk and (mpk l , msk l ), for each G l . He provides A with all the mpk l 's and gpk. Queries: A can make the following queries to the challenger:
-Enrol to G 0 : A requests the enrolment of a member M i to G 0 . C obtains the keys for M i for G 0 . A obtains nothing. -Derivation: A requests the enrolment of a member M i to G l , provided that M i is already registered to the parent group G k of G l . C obtains the keys for M i for the group G l . A obtains the keys only if M i is corrupted. A also obtains all the informations that were exchanged on public channels during the derivation process. -Sign: A requests that a member M i of a group G l signs for G l using a chosen challenge message m. The challenger computes the signature σ of M i on m. A obtains σ. -User Corruption: A requests the corruption of a given member M i . He obtains all the secret keys of M i for all the groups to which he is registered. M i is revoked from G 0 , and, through Downwards Revocation, from every group to which he belongs. -GM Corruption: A requests the corruption of the manager GM l of a group G l . He obtains the secret key msk l of GM l , and all the informations stored by GM l : enrolment informations and the keys (and consequently the revocation tokens rt l i ) of the members of G l .
-Revocation: A requests the revocation of a user M i from a group G l (and consequently, from all group under G l in G, through Downwards Revocation). He learns all the revocation tokens of M i that are disclosed during this phase. He can optionally request upwards revocations and, in this case, he learns the informations sent by GM l to the managers of the parent group. If he wants, he can then do a Revocation request on this user for this parent group. Output: A outputs a challenge message m, a signature σ and a group G l such that GM l has not been corrupted. A wins the game if:
1. Verify(σ,m,G l )=valid; 2. A did not obtain σ by making a signing query on m. The scheme is said to satisfy Traceability if no polynomial probabilistic adversary is able to win the above game with a non-negligible probability.
The Cross-Unlinkability property is an extension of the Selfless-Anonymity property to the hierarchical group setting. It is not an extension of the Backward Unlinkability property, since we only use one period in the Sign algorithm.
The CU property ensures that a signature issued for the group G l remains anonymous even for the GM's of other groups, for instance the parent or the sibling groups in G.
We also insist on the fact that, in case of a revocation, if GM l does not inform the manager GM k of the parent group G k of G l that a given user is revoked from G l , the manager of G k is not able to know about the identity of this user.
Cross-Unlinkability: Consider the following CU game played by an adversary A: Setup: The challenger C runs the KeyGen algorithm, playing the role of all the GM's. He obtains gpk and (mpk l , msk l ), for each G l . He provides A with all the mpk l 's and gpk. Queries: A can make the following queries to the challenger:
-Enrol to G 0 : A requests the enrolment of a member M i to G 0 . C obtains the keys for M i for G 0 . A obtains nothing. -Derivation: A requests the enrolment of a member M i to G l , provided that M i is already registered to the parent group G k of G l . C obtains the keys of M i for the group G l . A obtains these keys only if M i is corrupted. A also obtains all the informations that were exchanged on public channels during the derivation process. -Sign: A requests that a member M i of a group G l signs for G l using a chosen challenge message m. The challenger computes the signature σ of M i on m. A obtains σ. -User Corruption: A requests the corruption of a given member M i . He obtains all the secret keys of M i for all the groups to which he is registered. -GM Corruption: A requests the corruption of the manager GM l of a group G l . He obtains the secret key msk l of GM l , and all the informations stored by GM l : enrolment informations and the keys (and consequently the revocation tokens rt l i ) of the members of G l .
-Revocation: A requests the revocation of a user M i from a group G l (and consequently, from all group under G l in G, through Downwards Revocation). He learns all the revocation tokens of M i that are disclosed during this phase. He can optionally request upwards revocations and, in this case, he learns the informations sent by GM l to the managers of the parent group. If he wants, he can then do a Revocation request on this user for this parent group. Challenge: A outputs two challenge messages m and m , two different members M 0 and M 1 and two groups G k and G l . They must be such that:
* , B follows the protocol. Otherwise, he aborts. -Revocation: B follows the protocol as far as G * is not concerned by the revocation process. If it is, B requests the global revocation token of the user from C and publishes it. For the Upwards Revocation case, B follows the protocol (he is able to do it, since he knows all derivation informations).
Challenge: A outputs two challenge messages m and m , two different members M 0 and M 1 and two groups G k and G l fulfilling the conditions mentioned in the CU game. If G k = G * and G l = G * , B aborts. Otherwise, we assume w.l.o.g. that G k = G * . B chooses a random bit b , signs m for M b for the group G l to obtain σ * . He then proceeds to the Challenge BU phase with C with a choice m, M 0 , M 1 and period "0". (It is easy to check that we fulfil the requirements of the Challenge BU phase.) B obtains a signature σ * . Let us denote by b the random bit chosen by C. σ * and σ * are transmitted to A. Restricted Queries: A and B interact as in the Queries phase, as long as it does not contradict the requirements of the Challenge phase.
Output: A outputs a guess β ∈ {0, 1} on the boolean β = (b == b ). If (β = 1), B outputs b , else it outputs 1 − b .
We can see that the cases of abortion by B happen with non-overwhelming probability. Since the advantage of A against the CU game is non negligible, so is the advantage of B against the BU game, which would contradict the fact that the BP scheme is backward-unlinkable.
Thus, our protocol achieves Cross-Unlinkability.
Theorem 4.
In the random oracle model and under the q-SDH assumption, the protocol defined in Section 4.1 achieves Traceability.
Proof (Traceability). Let us assume that there is an adversary A that is able to win the Traceability game with non-negligible probability, we describe how to build an adversary B that is able to win the Traceability game of the BP group signature with non negligible probability. Let G * be the group considered in the BP Traceability game, the challenger C considered in the following is the challenger of the BP Traceability game. We model the hash function Hash as a random oracle. When B uses it, he picks a uniformly random number while preserving consistency.
We proceed exactly as in the CU proof for the Setup and the Queries phases. We now explain how to manage the Output phase.
Output: A outputs a message m, a signature σ and group G l . If G l = G * , abort. Otherwise, B outputs m, σ and period "0" to C. Then, as the requirements for both considered games are equivalent, if A wins the BP Traceability game, B wins the Traceability game.
We can see that the cases of abortion by B happen with non-overwhelming probability. Since the advantage of A against the BP Traceability game is non negligible, so is the advantage of B against the Traceability game, which would contradict the fact that the BP scheme is traceable.
Thus, our protocol achieves Traceability.
The proof that Exculpability of the underlying BP group signature scheme implies Exculpability of the protocol is straightforward.
Application to Anonymous Authentication
In [7] , Bringer et al. suggest to use VLR group signatures to build a biometric anonymous authentication scheme. Their scheme is based on the [5] scheme but can easily be instantiated using any VLR scheme. It can also easily be extended to a non-biometric setting. We describe it with the notations of Section 2.3 for the users keys.
In the [7] setting, members of a group G authenticate to service providers P (who are different from GM ) while remaining anonymous within G. Moreover, secret keys of the users are derived from an acquisition of a biometric trait. When a user M i applies to join G, an acquisition b of a biometric trait B is made. The group manager and the user then run the Join GS algorithm with the additional requirement that f i = H(b) where H is a hash function. M i then stores b and x i , A i on a device such as a smart-card.
When M i wants to authenticate to a service provider P , he connects his device to a trusted sensor. He is acquired a fresh biometric trait b . The sensor also gets b and A i from the device. If b and b match, then the sensor signs a challenge message sent by P using Sign GS with f i = H(b), x i and A i . P then checks the signature using Verify GS and accepts the authentication if the signature is valid. This authentication process is summed up in Figure 3 . We can adapt our hierarchical setting to the [7] setting. In this case, several hierarchical groups are available to users and they can anonymously authenticate towards service providers requiring belonging to one or several of these groups. The group signatures associated to these groups are then cross-unlinkable hierarchical group signatures as described in this paper. The adaptation is straightforward and the use of biometrics does not impact our constructions, since we had no requirements on the f l i parts of the secret keys of the users.
